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ABSTRACt
The requirements for mechanisms used in the Space Transportation System
(STS) are to provide dual fault tolerance, and if the payload equipment
violates the Shuttle bay door envelope, these deploymentlrestow mechanisms
must have independent primary and backup features. This paper describes the
research and development of an electromechanical actuator that meets these
requirements and will be used on the Transfer Orbit Stage (TOS) _rogram.
INTRODUCTION
This depioymentlrestow mschanism will be used to perform three separate
functions on the _OS program:
o Provide power to latch and unlatch the upper half of the forward
Airborne Support Equipment (ASE) cradle.
o Provide power to open and close the upper half of the forward ASE
cradle.
o Tilt the TOS/spaoeoraft (TOS/SC) combination for separation from the
. Shuttle and restow the aft ASE cradle for landing.
The Shuttle/TOS on-orbit configuration is illustrated in Figure 1.
REQUIR_NTS
The requirements imposed on the actuator mechanism to perform the
required functions are summarized as follows:
Safety Requirements (in accordance with NXB 1700.7A)
o Independent primary and backup actuator functions are mandatory.
o Combination of primary and backup methods must be two-failure
tol e_ant.
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Operational Requ._ements
o Provide power to lat_ and unlatch the for,_ardcradle halves.
o Provide power to open and close the upper half of the forward cradle
112° +_5° .
o Erect tho TOS/SC combination 45° +5° for separation.
o Provide erection capability under active Vernier Reaction Control
System (VRCS) or free-drift conditions the Primary Reactlon Control
System, (PRCS) and Orbiter Maneuvering System (0143)are inhibited
during rotation,
o Provide capability to react VP._S and PRCS when TOS/SC is in the
erected position.
o Provide multiple erecticn/restow cycle capability for each mission;
restow capability for an abortive mission is mandatory.
o Provide performance for 80 orbiter missions over i0 years.
3_stem Requlrments
o _latch or latch forward cradle in less than 4 minutes.
o kiae or _ower forward cradle half 112• in less than 2 minutes.
o Erect or restow TOS/SC _5° in leas than 2 minu_es.
o Withstand all deployment and landing loads (each actuator). These
loads to be reacted through the actuator str_Ictureand lock gears.
o Not to exceed 310 N (70 ib) per actuator.
o Operate at temperatures from -28ec to +59eC (-15eP to +llloep).
o Provide redundant limit switches, solaloida, OC power and avionics.
o Provide (one motor/clutch combination) sufficient torque under
worst-case conditions to perfom required f_notton.
o Provide force mar6ina of 100_ at worst-nase conditions for all
actuators.
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CONCEPT DEVELO?MENT
During the design trade-off phase, several priorities were established as
design goaIs. These were
o Satisfy alI safety requirements of NHB I700-7A without any waiver
requests.
o Use minimal design complexity and manufacturing simplicity.
o Use previously qualified space hardware and components.
o Provide a common design capable of a broad range of torque output
forces :_Ith minimal configuration changes.
o Combine additional mechanism functions within the actuator to
eliminate additional separate mechanisms.
HARDWARE CONFIGURATION
Each actuator, as illustrated in Figure 2 consists of the following major
components:
o Structural housing containing the ball screw and nut assembly,
reduction gear train, and attachment clevis ends.
o Redundant DC searhead _otors.
o Redundant DC solenoid-type, positive-engagement clutches.
o Sprlng-loaded drlve-engagement pin and pyrotechnic disengage.
o Redundant positlon-indication potentlometers.
o Redundant solenold-powered lock gears.
o Redundant mlcroswitches for lock-gear and actuator-engagement-pin
indication.
ACTUATOR FEATURES
Most actuator systems presently being used on the STS are physically
separated from the structure in the event of primary actuator failure, th,,s
allowln_ the backup actuator to b_ used. These systems require separate
swlngaway, _atch, and latch mechanisms. The Martin Marietta actuator is
self-contained in the event of primary actuator disengagement. This is
possible since the actuator selector drive pin with its pyro release Is
contained within the actuator. The disengaged primary activator simply
becomes a free-slidlr_, telescoping tube assembly.
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Additionally, the actuator has been designed to wlth3tand the crbiter
launch and landing loads, the TOS/SC deployment loads, and the orbiter
maneuvering loads. This design feature eliminated the requizement for a
separate landing lock mechanism and a deployment lock mechanism.
R_te control is normally used with actuators to control the output speed
and prevent excessive slew rates to the payload being raised for deployment.
This closed-loop, complex electronic control is required on rotarT actuator
systems and some existing screw-drlve systems to prevent a possible runaway
condition.
In the Martin Marietta actuator, this ,ate controller can be eliminated
because drive motor gearhead reduction limits th_ ._axlmum RPM. Maximum screw
extenslon/retraction rates cannot exceed the free running speed of the drive
motor as reduced through the reduction gear train and drlve nut.
The maximum impact force when erecting the TOS/SC is less than 33.9 N-m
(25 ib ft.). This low impact fol_e alluws the use of a simple structural
hard stop, rather than a viscous damper.
The actuator motor shutoff is accomplished by use of a ,edundant motor
current limiting circuit. The structure being deployed, or stowed, contacts
a structural hard stop, thus increasing motor current demand, and motor
shutoff Occurs.
This method allows the required ].00% force margin at worst-case
conditions, while preventing structural overloads under best-case
conditions. Additionally, the clutch assembly can be adjusted to slip at a
predetermined torque, also preventing an acaldental overload conditlon.
Posltlon indication to the crew Is accomplished by the use of redundant
rotary potentiometers that provide actuator extension/retraction data.
Since the actuator mechanism ls a back-driveable device, a locking
mechanism must be incorporated. A redundant, solenoid-operated, dual-gear,
mesh lock has been s_lected for this design. A similar design ha_ previously
been used on the Inertial UpDer StaKe (IUS) program.
DISCUSSION
This actuator mechenisa m_ete all the STS safety requirements as defined
in E_B 1700.7A, and also meets the structural, life, an_ TOS missior
+ requirements for the followlng reasons:
+
o The orbiter crew can use the Standard _Itc_ Panel (SSP) at any
! point in the actuation cycle to stop, restart, and dlsenease the
primary actuator, and engage the backup actuator. This allows for
complete restow of the TOS/SC in case of a mission abort.
! o Force margln_ are at least 100_ greater than the required torques at
! worst-case con |itions (FiKure_ 3A, B and C).
l
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o Each pair of actuators, primary and backup, has triple electrical
redundancy and complete mechanical redundancy°
o All rolling-element bearings are sized to exceed the LlO life by a
minimum factor of 17.
o Each actuator is capable of greater than i000 duty cycles during its
operating life, which far exceeds the 80 mission requirement.
i o Clutches are designed for positive power-off disengagement using
redundant, captive compression springs.
o The structural ultimate factor of safety is 1.4 minimum. Gear
stress levels are less than one-fourth of the material ultimate
stresses.
o Lubrication is a combination of wet and dry lubricants. All sliding
, surfaces are treated with space-qualified dry lubricants; however,
they are desired to function without ]ubrication. All bearings,
gears, and ball screw are lubricated with Bray Oil 3_-38RP, a
qualifled vacuum-stable grease.
o The static load capability of the actuator is 8000 lb.
o The actuator design can be easily modified to meet a variety of
forc_ and extension/retraction rate requirements (Table i).
CONCLUSION
The actuator design selected for use on the TOS program meets the
requirements for STS safety requirements. This design has successfully
passed the NASA Phase I Safety Review without receiving any mechanical Review
Item Disc,'_pancies, nor were any safety waivers required. The desi_ studlea
and tradeoff analysis resulted in a multifunction, simple mechanism that is
easily adaptable to various output torque requirements aria
extension/retraction cycle times.
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